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Applying the principle of the tort in cases of Clinical Negligence, the UK Supreme has said that the law-imposed responsibility only for foreseeable consequences and hence a medical practitioner can be held liable only for the disability which could be foreseen and not for an additional disability.

The case relates to one Ms. Meadows who was aware of the risk that she was a carrier of the haemophilia gene, which can give rise to the hereditary disease in which the ability of blood to coagulate is severely reduced.

Since she did not want a child with that condition, she consulted Dr. Hafshah Khan in 2006, to obtain and discuss the results of the blood tests to confirm whether she was a carrier of the haemophilia gene.

Dr Khan told her that the results were normal. As a result of the advice, Ms. Meadows went on to conceive a child in 2010, who was diagnosed as having haemophilia after his birth. In December 2015, Adejuwon (the child) was diagnosed as also suffering from autism.

Ms. Meadows filed a case before a UK High Court seeking compensation on the pretext that had the general practitioners referred the appellant for genetic testing in 2006, she would have known that she was a carrier of the haemophilia gene before she became pregnant. In those circumstances, she would have undergone foetal testing for haemophilia when she became pregnant in 2010. That testing would have revealed that her son was affected by haemophilia. If so informed, she would have chosen to terminate her pregnancy and Adejuwon would not have been born.

The High Court held Dr. Khan liable for the costs associated with both Adejuwon’s haemophilia and his autism and observed that as a matter of “but for” causation.

 Adejuwon would not have been born but for the defendant’s negligence and awarded Ms. Meadows compensation of £9m inclusive of interest.

The Award was appealed in the Appellate Court which reduced the award of damages to £1.4m holding that Dr Khan was not liable for the costs associated with Adejuwon’s autism because that type of loss was not within the scope of the risks which she had undertaken to protect Ms. Meadows against and therefore was not within the scope of her duty of care.

Thereafter Ms. Meadows filed an appeal before the UK Supreme Court against the Appellate Court’s order contending she was entitled to damages for the continuation of the pregnancy and its consequences, including all the costs related to Adejuwon’s disabilities arising out of the pregnancy.

Dr Khan however argued that her liability should be limited to the costs associated with Adejuwon’s haemophilia and that the costs associated with his autism fall outside the scope of the duty she owed to the appellant.

A seven-judge bench of the UK Supreme Court comprising Lord Reed (President), Lord Hodge (Deputy President), Lady Black, Lord Kitchin, Lord Sales, Lord Leggatt and Lord Burrowscould dismissed the appeal filed by Ms. Meadows and upheld the Appellate Courts order.

The Court held that,
“the law did not impose on Dr Khan any duty in relation to unrelated risks which might arise in any pregnancy. It follows that Dr Khan is liable only for the costs associated with the care of Adejuwon insofar as they are caused by his haemophilia”.

It was further observed that “given the purpose for which the service was undertaken by Dr Khan, and there being no questions of remoteness of loss, other effective cause or mitigation of loss, the law imposes upon her responsibility for the foreseeable consequences of the birth of a boy with haemophilia, and in particular the increased cost of caring for a child with haemophilia.”